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Johannes
Fritsche (Technisches Universität, Berlin)
Abstract
Aristotle develops his theory on monsters at the end of his biological writings.
To spell out its presuppositions I present, to the degree necessary, (1)
some of his epistemological and ontological assumptions, (2) his theory
of principles in the Physics, (3) the basics of his biological
research, and (4) his own distinction between his ontology and biology
on one side and assumptions of pre-Socratic philosophers on the other.
Thereafter, I (5) relate Aristotle’s biology to the Greek life-world, so
to speak, (6) return to the issue of Aristotle and pre-Socratic
philosophers and discuss for that purpose (7) Empedocles and (8) some
similarities and differences between Hesiod, Empedocles, and Aristotle.
(9) In sum, Aristotle’s theory on monsters is, as it were, the
ontologization and absolutification of the conviction of the Greek
societies at his time that it was the fabricating and tool- and
slave-using animal that had cleansed the world of monsters. Finally, I
(10) relate the issue to two Christian dogmas.
Bio
Johannes Fritsche teaches philosophy
in the Institut für Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie, Wissenschafts- und
Technikgeschichte of the Technisches Universität Berlin.
He is the author of Methode und Beweisziel im ersten Buch der Physikvorlesung des Aristoteles
(Frankfurt: Anton Hain, 1986) and Historical Destiny and National Socialism in Heidegger's
Being and Time (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), as well as many
essays on Greek and contemporary philosophy.
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